About 60 cases of both failures and succes ;es of quantitative methods in management, collected in industry, business and government in the Netherlands, are analyzed for features determining either their failure or their success.
triggered off a branch of literature, which conceres itself with the interpenetration of the literature and the real world, It is caiied implementation research. Mar_y authors write about a gap [e.g., 21] , which may be caused by a time lag or, unfortunately, by repulsion [38] . In Germany, a shortage of empirical research was observed [29] and a large-scale remedial research project was funded which is beginning to bear fruit [30] .
At least three books have been devoted to implementation research [7, 14, 35] ; the European Working Group on 'Methodology of OR' is much involved with implementation [16, 23] ; Schultz and Slevin [36] started a column on 'Implementation Exchange' in Interfaces. Wysocki [43] describes a bibliography of 276 publications in 1979, which is progressing at an increasing speed. Milutinovich and Melt [26] review 350 publications.
Implementation research can either take the literature as its object [4, 24, 25, 32] , or the real world. An indirect view is taken by the review articles of implementation research, the surveys of the surveys, so to speak [13, 26, 43] .
Implementation studies dealing with the real world may be based on a) experience, b) questionnaires, c) interviews, d) case stodies. Ada. Authors' own subjective experience is a perfectly legitimate basis for empirical studies, provided the author is an expert and an autbority. Much of the vast Interfaces literature on implementation is based on experience [3, 6, 9, 10, 22, 31, 33] , but also scientifically more prestigious publications accept subjective papers based on experience [5, 7, 12, 27] . Of course, some authors speculate about more exotic paradigms, like transactional analysis [20] , Zen [281 or anthroposophy [8] .
Ad b. Questionnaires are often mailed, espe-ciaUy by Axnericans, to either members of OP,/MS societies or firms, e.g, [19] . The problem with mail surveys, though, is probable biases of the results due to low response rates, e.g., 31% [11, 24% [11] ,
Ad c. Interviews usually have much higher 'response rates' and allow a more in-depth analysis and testing of hypotheses, e.g. [2, 15, 30, 39, 42] .
Ad d. Case studies allow perhaps still more penetrating analysis of implementation problems, although their statistical significance varies. Lockett and Polding [18] analyze three case studies, Roberts [34] four, Alter 56 and Bean and Radnor 43, both in [71.
This paper is based on 58 cases [401. The order of presentation is as follows. First the collection of 36 case studies, containJ=g the 58 cases, is described (Section 2); next :he question of biases in the samples of the cases and of the reasons for failures or successes is discussed (Section 3); then the results are presented (Section 4). Section 5 consists of a summary and conclusions.
36 case studies of failures and successes
The original object of collecting between thirty and forty case studies in industry, business and government was not to do implementation research but to celebrate the 25~h anniversary of the Netherlands Society of Operations Research (NSOR). The resulting collection of 36 case studies was published in a popular Dutch paperbzck edition and is translated by A.,.twood and Knoppers for an English edition by Wiley [40] .
363 members of NSOR (98% of the personal membersh.ip) plus 50 F!amish-spe~dng members of the Belgian ~ ~:~ eo,,,~ty for the Application of Scientific Methods in Management (So~sc~/~vw_a) were invited by telephone to write a contribution. TL, is cascaded down to 200 statements of interest, 70 promises and 36 actual papers, 34 of w,:ich are Dutch and 2 Belgian.
The instructions to authors were rat~er rigorous. We wanted concise, we!t-readable, nontechnical contributions of less than 3000 words (the most severe constraint). Each contribution should introduce the OR activities at the author's firm/institution and describe two cases, one of which should be a failure, the other a success. Fach ,~ase should describe the problem, the approach, the results, the reasons why the resuti~, were negative in one case and positive iv. ~he other, and conclusions. It was left to the i~agi.n_a~ie.~ ~f the authors to decide if a case were a failu~'e era success; we merely indicated that in case of a failure the costs of the project outweigb, the benefits and in case of a success it is the other way round.
The reason that we obliged authors to write about a failure was that we believe tha" one man's fault is another man's iesson. In the literature., it might even be attractive to focus, v.nlike h~,te~fisces, on failures rather than successes Some poter:tial authors dropped out because they could nor. find, or were not allowed to write about, a case that failed. A few others could not find a su.,:cessf~t case! Still others had been working on ju~: c, ne big project in the past few years. Jn that case they were asked to write about the c,ne pr~ecl, b~.~. showing both side,'., of the r~eda], the partial failurc~ and the partial successes, the trial~ and c.rror'-:. :.~c pitfalls and snags.
The 36 case studies received describe 58 diff:srent cases. Naturall:¢, it was stressed f:~r the ~.%,.':a] reader that failures ar, d s-~ccesse,, were supposed ~o occur ip equal proportions in the book. but p, ct in ti~e real world ! After the event it was reakize6 that ~he collection of cases could be used to do imp!er,.-2enta~ioc research. This amounted merely te analyzmg the rcasor.s given for failures and successes by the authors ~hemsetves. But before we do that. ,~e have to discuss the questior~ of representa:.iv;ty ,)f the sample.
3, ~i~ses ~a the sample?
The case studies; car~ be cbzs~ified according ~<~ three di_mensions, viT. accordhqg ~o (a) prob}:em areas, (b) techniques employed and (c) sectors of the economy. Table 1 presents the number of failures ana successes by problem areas dealt Mth. The only significant difference between fl~e number of failures and successes seems to be in routing and scheduling. Table 2 presents the number of failures and successes by techniques employexl. Wedley and Ferrie [421 conjectured that (a) projects in which managers participate have more. success, (b) managers participate more in linear programming project~, hence, (c) linear programming projects are more often successful. "[his coojecture is not borne out by our data. The only strLking difference between failures and successes is h~ combinatorial optimization, probably because of the complexity of the models (cf. next section). Table 3 presents the percentage distribution of tiie case s~.udies by sectors of eccnomic activity, compared to the percentage distribution of total labour vo!ume in the Netherlands and of the membership of the Netherlands Society of Operations Research. The distribution of case studies over sectors corresponds faLrly well with the distribution of NSOR membership, especially if one takes into zc_~,mnt that we have discouraged academics to contnhttte, asking them twice if their case study concerne,a a real life problem and not an ~academic' probh~ J~. If we comlzaxe the distribution of case studies ~vitb the di~tr;.buticn of total labour volume in the Netherlands, we see, that the quartary sector, Go,rernment, and academia in particular, is overrepresented anti the tertiary_ sector, Services, is underrepresented in the case studies. This may be partly caused by the fact that * If one t:-roject was described, it was cot,:lied on both s' .' _~es. If one project was desc-'ibed, it was counted on troth sides.
there are many small-scale firms in Services with ~oo small-scale problems (cf. next section). Our collection of case st~tdies is far from being a random sample from all quantitative methods applied in management in the Netherlands. There may be biases in the distribution over problem areas, techniques emplo~yed, or sectors of economic activity. There may be bias.~s in the size dis:ribution of the firms/instituions represented, although the sizes range from the numbers 2 and 23 on the Fortta~e 1981 list of largest indu,;trial companies in the world (Royal Dutch/Shell Group and Pbilips' Gloeilampenfibrieken, respectively), down to the one-man :onsultancy firm of Knoppers There may be )iases in the atr:hors, approached through the N ;OR membership, because the NSOR membersl: ip is dominated by its 36% mathematicians and 21 ~ econometricians [39] . There certairdy are biases due to the required 50-50 proportion of failure i and successes, to the obliged to admit failures. Therefore, we have to F8 3 expect, and take account of, two kinds of biases in F9 1 the reasons given for failures or successes: F10 7 1) A bias away from self-evidences to the authors, Fll 5 e.g. 'we had sufficient know-how, computer facili-i7 ties, software available', c) Relation-oriented F12 3 2) A bias away from self-indictments of the authors, e.g. :we did not have sufficient know-how, V13 7 we did not sell our project properly'.
Concluding, we hardly see any reason that the F14 6 biases in the sample of cases would cause bia,,es in cesses, but we expect some biases in the latter sample due to neglect of self-evidences and the _32 fact that the judges are involved in the judgments. 79 
Reasons for failures and successes
I classified the reasons given for failures and for ,,~,ccesses independently and I realize that classifying open-ended statements from case studies is a subjective job. Fortunately, the base material is available [40] , so the job can be replicated! I had expected that the reasons given tor failures would be the opposites of the reasons given for mecesses. This turned out to be true to a limited e~:tent.
Tables 4 and 5 present the reasons given for failures and successes. The order by whica they are presented is: (a) orientation towards the :lient, (b) towards the OR/MS consultant and (c~ towards the relation between the two, and wit Mn these orientations, roughly ~ top-down'.
If we scrutinize Tables 4 and 5 , some reasons for failure or success may be termed pairs of opposites, viz., F3-$3, F6-84, F8-$5, F9-$6, F10-S7, F12-S10, F13-Sll, Ft4-S12, F16-Sl4. More interestingly, some reasons do not have counterparts, viz., FI, F2, F4, F5, F7, FIi, t-:5 and $I, $2, $8, $9, Si3. More g,,er, among tt~e pairs, it happens that one reason occurs frequently but its opposite rarely, notaby, F6-$4 a~d F16-$14.
So much for semantics, If we ,::ow m~ke pragmatic remarks about the results in Tables 4 and 5 , naturally we refer to subjective, implicit hy-pothese~ or expectations, either refuted or borne out by the results. Everybod): is free, though, to make his own observations. -Organizational changes (F2) are a frequent rea--on for failure we had not thought of. However strong the resistance to change (F1) may be. organizationa! changes, tike reo':ganizations or transfers of clients, kill projects.
-Problem too small-scale (F6} rightly is a reason for failure of projects --and probab!y is aa innumerable number of ~.k, aes the reason to refrain from starting a project a~ all. An analysis has been made of reasons given for failures and successes in 36 case studies, describing 58 cases, collected from Dutch industry., business and government at the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Netherlands Society of Operations Research [40] . All authors were supposed to describe one failure and one succe~, and to #ve reasons for them.
The main conclusions from the results are: -there is still a lot of OR/MS work to be done, building models dmt fit problems better; -quick and clean work, cutting out simple and flexible models, leads to success; -a soft, friendly approach, involving and informing the user, is crucial. A general pragmatic recommendation ensuing from the foregoing analysis is: when implementing an OR project, try to avoid causes leading frequently to failure (given in Table 4 ) and try to strengthen causes leading frequently to success (given in Table 5 ).
-Project mismanagement (F4) and too much tackled at once (F9) .are rare self-indit.tments that are supposedly u ~tderrepresente -1.
-Model too coraplex (F10) --hear, hear! -Computer-time exct..,;sive (Fll) was not expected. after three decades of explosive growth of computer power.
-User involvement (F13, $11) or, what is more, user understanding (F14, S12) and ,ease of use (S13) are still more cruci;d than we had thought. -Mismatch of model and problem (F16) wa~ a frequent reason of fai~ur that I could not think of naming otherwise. It w0s using the wrong standard 'solution' or tailori~g the wrong ad hoe model. Happy consequence: there ~:emains work to be done by OR/MS workers.
-Benefits in the form of money (S1) cr improved decision making ($2) are rather tautological reasons for success ~ and forgotten self-e vidences in the opposite ease.
-Simp,e, dear, flexible models th;~t progress quickly but step-by-step ($5, $6, $7, S ~) ~ hear, hear! -Good model fit (S14) --a self-evide~.~ce usually forgotteu unless the reverse is true (Fi~9.
